Regulation · (EU) 2024/2847 · interactive guide

REGULATION (EU) 2024/2847

A practical selection of Cyber Resilience Act articles and annexes — each with a plain summary, a CypherOn note and a link to the official text on EUR-Lex.

Official text (EUR-Lex) ↗
What this page is and what it is not Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 has 71 articles and eight annexes. This page turns them into a practical selection — the provisions that manufacturers, importers and distributors actually deal with. What we left out of each chapter, and why, is stated in the opening card of that chapter. We do not reproduce the text of the regulation. Each provision comes with our paraphrase of the subject matter in our own words and a separate “CypherOn note”, which is our commentary, not the text of the law. Only the text published in the Official Journal is binding, which is why every provision links to the relevant article in the English text on EUR-Lex. Official translations also get corrected, and in one place the Czech text diverges from the English in a way that changes the meaning — see Annex IV. For a continuous account of the terminology, the Czech implementing act and the state of harmonised standards, see the CRA guide.

Žádný paragraf neodpovídá hledanému výrazu.

Chapter I

General provisions (Art. 1 to 12)

Overview

What we picked from Chapter I and what we did not

Chapter I sets out the subject matter, the scope and the definitions, and introduces three tiers of products. We picked what decides the question “does this apply to us”: the scope (Art. 2), the definitions (Art. 3), the basic rule for making a product available on the market (Art. 6), the product categories (Art. 7 and 8) and the overlap with the AI Act (Art. 12). We left out Art. 1 (subject matter), Art. 4 (free movement), Art. 5 (procurement and use), Art. 9 (stakeholder consultation), Art. 10 (skills) and Art. 11 (general product safety) — they are addressed to the Member States and the Commission and give a manufacturer nothing to act on.

CypherOn note
The order worth reading it in: Art. 2 first (am I in scope?), then Art. 3, point (13) (am I a manufacturer?), then Art. 7 and 8 together with Annexes III and IV (which class am I in?). Only after that does it make sense to open Annex I. If you want the answer faster, run the scope calculator and then come back here to check it against the text.
Official text: Chapter I on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 2

Scope

The regulation applies to products with digital elements made available on the market whose intended purpose or reasonably foreseeable use includes a direct or indirect data connection to a device or network. Products covered by sector-specific regimes are excluded — medical devices, in vitro diagnostics, motor vehicles, products certified in civil aviation and marine equipment. Also excluded are spare parts produced to the same specifications as the component they replace, and products developed exclusively for national security, defence or the processing of classified information. The Commission may, by delegated act, limit the application of the regulation where sector-specific rules deliver the same or a higher level of protection.

CypherOn note
The most common mistake in practice is to derive scope from whether anyone actually connects the product. What counts is the intended purpose and the reasonably foreseeable use, and an indirect connection is enough — including one that only arises through the larger assembly the component is built into. The second mistake: being outside the CRA does not mean a product with no cybersecurity requirements; those sit in the relevant sector-specific act and tend to be stricter. If you are unsure about a specific product, run the scope calculator.
Official text: Art. 2 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 3

Definitions

The article contains 51 definitions. Four of them decide most questions in practice. A manufacturer (point 13) is not only whoever develops or manufactures the product, but also whoever has it designed, developed or manufactured and markets it under its own name or trademark, whether for payment, monetisation or free of charge. An open-source software steward (point 14) is a legal person, other than a manufacturer, whose purpose is to provide systematic and sustained support for the development of specific open-source products intended for commercial activities and to ensure their viability. A substantial modification (point 30) is a change after the product has been placed on the market that affects compliance with the essential requirements in Part I of Annex I or changes the intended purpose; an actively exploited vulnerability (point 42) is one for which there is reliable evidence that a malicious actor has exploited it without permission of the system owner.

CypherOn note
Point 13 is why rebranding or white-labelling creates the full set of manufacturer obligations — and why, with bought-in hardware carrying your logo, relying on the supplier is not enough. Point 42 is the threshold for the reporting duty under Art. 14: you do not report every CVE you find, only a vulnerability you have evidence is being exploited; that also determines what you watch in operations (KEV, telemetry, customer reports). Point 30 is the single most important sentence for lifecycle planning, because it decides whether a product placed on the market before December 2027 ends up in the regime of the regulation. So define now, internally, what does and does not count as a substantial modification for you, and write it into your release process.
Official text: Art. 3 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 6

Requirements for products with digital elements

One sentence that carries the whole regulation. A product may be made available on the market only if it meets the essential cybersecurity requirements in Part I of Annex I — provided it is properly installed, maintained and used for its intended purpose or under reasonably foreseeable conditions — and if the processes put in place by the manufacturer meet the requirements in Part II of Annex I.

CypherOn note
The pairing matters, and the second half is routinely overlooked. A secure product is not enough: there must also be processes for handling vulnerabilities, and they are assessed in their own right. In practice that means, alongside the security properties, a demonstrable SBOM, a channel for receiving reports, a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and a mechanism for distributing updates securely. How that is built into development is covered in our DevSecOps guide.
Official text: Art. 6 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 7

Important products with digital elements

A product whose core functionality falls within one of the categories in Annex III counts as an important product and is subject to the stricter conformity assessment procedures under Art. 32(2) and (3). The regulation says explicitly that integrating such a product into another product does not, in itself, make that other product an important product.

CypherOn note
What counts is the core functionality of the product as a whole, not what sits inside it. An embedded browser does not turn an ordinary application into an important product; conversely, a product whose purpose is identity management or network management belongs in Annex III even if it is “only” a library. Annex III describes the categories with short names that will not settle a borderline case on their own — the technical description was added by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392, and that is now the main document for classification. Put your classification in writing, with reasons, before you start planning dates: it changes the entire route to CE marking.
Official text: Art. 7 on EUR-Lex ↗ · Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392 ↗
Art. 8

Critical products with digital elements

For the categories in Annex IV, the Commission may determine by delegated act that a product must obtain a European cybersecurity certificate at assurance level at least “substantial” in order to demonstrate conformity — and only where an adopted European cybersecurity certification scheme is available to manufacturers for that category. The required assurance level has to be proportionate to the risk and must take into account the critical dependence of essential entities under NIS 2 on the product.

CypherOn note
Certification is therefore not switched on automatically for critical products. Until a delegated act exists for your category, you follow the class II regime (Art. 32(4)) — which still means a notified body. For planning, the point is that once such an act appears, the route to market stretches from weeks to months and the capacity of certification bodies is limited. If you build secure elements, smart cards or hardware with security boxes, track this article regularly, not once.
Official text: Art. 8 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 12

High-risk AI systems

A product that falls under the CRA and is at the same time a high-risk AI system under Art. 6 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 is deemed to comply with the cybersecurity requirements of Art. 15 of the AI Act, provided it meets Part I of Annex I, its manufacturer meets Part II of Annex I, and the level of protection achieved is confirmed in the EU declaration of conformity issued under the CRA. Conformity assessment then normally runs under the AI Act procedure, and notified bodies competent for AI are also competent for the Annex I requirements of the CRA. For important and critical products, however, the CRA procedures apply to the cybersecurity requirements.

CypherOn note
This is the only place where the CRA and the AI Act meet in a way that saves work — but only if both assessments are run as a single file. In practice that means one set of technical documentation (see Art. 31(3)), one risk assessment and one declaration of conformity, not two parallel folders. Watch paragraph 3: for products in Annexes III and IV the benefit disappears and you do the cybersecurity part under the CRA anyway. The wider AI Act picture is covered in the AI Act guide.
Official text: Art. 12 on EUR-Lex ↗

Chapter II

Obligations of economic operators and open source (Art. 13 to 26)

Overview

What we picked from Chapter II and what we did not

This is the core of the regulation for anyone who puts something on the market. We picked the obligations of manufacturers (Art. 13), the reporting obligations (Art. 14), the platform through which reports are made (Art. 16), authorised representatives (Art. 18), the obligations of importers (Art. 19) and distributors (Art. 20), both rules on manufacturer obligations passing to other parties (Art. 21 and 22) and the regime for open-source software stewards (Art. 24). We left out Art. 15 (voluntary reporting), Art. 17 (other provisions on reporting, addressed to ENISA and the CSIRTs network), Art. 23 (identification of economic operators at the request of a market surveillance authority), Art. 25 (voluntary security attestation of open-source software, which a delegated act still has to create) and Art. 26 (Commission guidance).

CypherOn note
A practical split: Art. 13 is years of work aimed at December 2027, Art. 14 is a process that has to work from 11 September 2026. They are two different things with different owners inside the company, and running them as one project is a mistake, because the faster one always loses. If you are building only one thing right now, build the reporting.
Official text: Chapter II on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 13

Obligations of manufacturers

The longest article in the regulation, 25 paragraphs. The manufacturer must design, develop and produce the product in line with Part I of Annex I, carry out a cybersecurity risk assessment and feed its outcome into planning, design, development, production, delivery and maintenance. The assessment is documented, kept up to date for the support period and included in the technical documentation, together with a justification for any requirement that does not apply to the product. The article also imposes due diligence on third-party components including open source, reporting of vulnerabilities to whoever maintains the component, a support period of at least five years, availability of issued security updates for at least ten years, information duties on the product and under Annex II, a single point of contact for users, disclosure of the end of the support period at the time of purchase, and retention of documentation for at least ten years.

CypherOn note
Three things this falls down on in practice. First: a risk assessment cannot be written retroactively, because under paragraph 2 it is meant to be an input into development — if it appears only before an audit, it shows at a glance. Second: the support period is a commercial decision that you print on the packaging and put into the documentation, and for equipment with a twelve-year service life you will not defend five years against the reasonable expectations of users; your ceiling is also set by the support periods of the components you use. Third: paragraph 6 changes your relationship with upstream — a finding in an open-source component is reported to whoever maintains it, and if you have developed a fix, you provide them with the code or the documentation. That needs an owner, not goodwill.
Official text: Art. 13 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 14

Reporting obligations of manufacturers

Introduces two separate reporting duties. An actively exploited vulnerability in the product, and a severe incident having an impact on the security of the product, are both reported by the manufacturer simultaneously to the CSIRT designated as coordinator and to ENISA through the single reporting platform. The same cascade applies to both: an early warning without undue delay and within 24 hours of becoming aware of the matter; a follow-up notification within 72 hours; and a final report within 14 days of a corrective or mitigating measure becoming available for a vulnerability, or within one month of the notification under point (b) for an incident. An incident is severe if it affects or can affect the ability of the product to protect the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of sensitive or important data or functions, or if it has led or can lead to the introduction or execution of malicious code in the product or in the systems of a user. Which CSIRT is yours follows from your main establishment in the Union; without one, a cascade runs through the authorised representative, the importer, the distributor and the number of users. The manufacturer informs affected users, where appropriate in a structured, machine-readable format.

CypherOn note
This article applies from 11 September 2026 and, under Art. 69(3), covers products that are on the market today. In practice it is the product-side counterpart of incident response, and it stands or falls on four roles: who decides that a vulnerability is actively exploited, who holds the 24-hour clock outside office hours, who writes the text of the notification and who talks to customers. The clock starts when you become aware of the matter, not when you get an account on the platform or when a lawyer arrives. An incident in your own infrastructure is not enough on its own — it has to have an impact on the security of the product, typically a compromise of the environment from which you distribute signed artefacts to customers.
Official text: Art. 14 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 16

Establishment of a single reporting platform

The platform for notifications under Art. 14 and 15 is established and operated by ENISA; the Member States and ENISA each have their own electronic notification end-points on it. The CSIRT that receives a notification first passes it on without delay to the coordinators in the Member States where, according to the information provided by the manufacturer, the product has been made available. In exceptional circumstances, and in particular at the request of the manufacturer, dissemination may be delayed on justified cybersecurity grounds for as long as is strictly necessary; in duly justified exceptional cases only limited information is shared with the others until the full notification can be disseminated. A delay is also possible where the vulnerability is subject to coordinated disclosure under NIS 2.

CypherOn note
Delaying dissemination is the only valve for the situation where a fix is not out yet and passing the notification on would increase the risk. It is not automatic — the CSIRT decides, not you, and your part is to flag the sensitivity of the information already in the early warning under Art. 14(2), point (a). The conditions for invoking cybersecurity grounds were filled in by Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/881. So write into your internal procedure who flags sensitivity and on what basis, rather than deciding it ad hoc at 3 a.m.
Official text: Art. 16 on EUR-Lex ↗ · Regulation (EU) 2026/881 ↗
Art. 18

Authorised representatives

A manufacturer may appoint an authorised representative by written mandate. The core of the manufacturer obligations cannot be delegated: Art. 13(1) to (11), the first subparagraph of Art. 13(12) and Art. 13(14). The mandate must at least allow the representative to keep the EU declaration of conformity and the technical documentation for at least ten years or for the support period, to provide them to the market surveillance authority on a reasoned request, and to cooperate on eliminating risks.

CypherOn note
The division is clear: a representative is an address and an archive, not the bearer of responsibility for the security of the product. Design, development, the risk assessment and the support period cannot be handed over. For manufacturers outside the Union it is nevertheless a practically necessary role — it also determines who you report to under Art. 14(7) if you have no main establishment in the Union. So draft the mandate concretely, with a list of tasks, not as a general power of attorney.
Official text: Art. 18 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 19

Obligations of importers

An importer may place on the market only a product that meets Part I of Annex I and whose manufacturer processes comply with Part II. Before placing it on the market, the importer must verify that the manufacturer carried out the conformity assessment under Art. 32, drew up the technical documentation, affixed the CE marking, enclosed the declaration of conformity and the information and instructions under Annex II in a language that is easily understood, and complied with the identification and information duties under Art. 13(15), (16) and (19). Where there is doubt, the product is not placed on the market, and where there is a significant cybersecurity risk, the importer informs both the manufacturer and the market surveillance authority. On learning of a vulnerability, the importer informs the manufacturer without undue delay; a copy of the declaration of conformity is kept for at least ten years or for the support period.

CypherOn note
The operative word is “verify”, not “receive”. An importer who merely has the declaration sent over by a supplier outside the Union, without checking that a conformity assessment and documentation stand behind it, carries the liability alone. In practice that means an incoming documentation check written into the purchasing process, and a contractual duty on the supplier to provide the documentation and keep it current. Watch paragraph 8 as well: if the manufacturer ceases operations, the duty to inform the authority and users falls on you.
Official text: Art. 19 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 20

Obligations of distributors

A distributor acts with due care and, before making a product available on the market, verifies that it bears the CE marking and that the manufacturer and the importer have met their identification and information duties and handed over the required documents. If, on the basis of the information at its disposal, it has reason to believe that the product or the manufacturer processes are not in conformity, it must not make the product available; where there is a significant cybersecurity risk, it informs the manufacturer and the market surveillance authority. On becoming aware of a vulnerability, it informs the manufacturer without undue delay and cooperates with the market surveillance authority on its reasoned request.

CypherOn note
The obligations of a distributor are deliberately lighter than those of an importer and are tied to the information it actually holds. That is not an excuse: if you resell software or hardware, there has to be a point in the process where the CE marking and the existence of documentation are checked, and it has to be clear where a vulnerability report from a customer gets sent. The distance between distributor and manufacturer is a single step — the moment you start modifying the product or selling it under your own name, Art. 21 applies.
Official text: Art. 20 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 21

Cases in which obligations of manufacturers apply to importers and distributors

A single sentence with a wide reach. An importer or distributor is considered a manufacturer, and Art. 13 and 14 apply to it, where it places a product on the market under its own name or trademark, or where it carries out a substantial modification of a product already on the market.

CypherOn note
This is the most common way a company that “only resells” turns into a manufacturer with the full set of obligations, including the risk assessment, the technical documentation and reporting under Art. 14. Two typical triggers: your own logo on the box, and your own firmware or configuration layer on top of somebody else's device. The decision is made before anyone notices it — in marketing and in purchasing, not in compliance. So write the rule into the approval process for new product lines, and define the threshold for a substantial modification against Art. 3, point (30).
Official text: Art. 21 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 22

Other cases in which obligations of manufacturers apply

A person who is neither a manufacturer, an importer nor a distributor, but who carries out a substantial modification of a product and makes it available on the market, is considered a manufacturer. The obligations under Art. 13 and 14 apply to that person in respect of the part of the product affected by the modification; where the modification affects the cybersecurity of the product as a whole, they apply to the whole product.

CypherOn note
This provision is for system integrators and for anyone who builds solutions out of other people's components and passes them on. The limitation of scope looks accommodating, but in practice it is a trap: as soon as the change touches authentication, cryptography, the update mechanism or a network interface, it affects the whole and the obligations cover the entire product. On integration projects it therefore pays to have it written down what exactly you modify and what you merely deploy — otherwise that line gets drawn in hindsight.
Official text: Art. 22 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 24

Obligations of open-source software stewards

An open-source software steward puts in place and verifiably documents a cybersecurity policy that fosters secure development and the effective handling of vulnerabilities by the developers of the product, supports voluntary reporting under Art. 15 and takes account of the specific nature of the steward. On a reasoned request it provides that documentation to the market surveillance authority and cooperates with it on mitigating risks. The reporting obligations under Art. 14(1) apply to the extent that the steward is involved in the development of products, and those under Art. 14(3) and (8) to the extent that severe incidents affect the network and information systems it provides for development.

CypherOn note
The steward regime is deliberately lighter than the manufacturer regime: no CE marking, no conformity assessment, and under Art. 64(10), point (b), no administrative fines under this regulation either. That does not make it nothing — the policy has to exist, has to be demonstrable, and the market surveillance authority can ask for it. What decides the classification is the definition in Art. 3, point (14): it must be a legal person whose purpose is to provide systematic and sustained support for the development of specific products intended for commercial activities. Contributing code does not by itself create this regime, whereas a foundation or association around a widely used library may well fall into it.
Official text: Art. 24 on EUR-Lex ↗

Chapter III

Conformity of products with digital elements (Art. 27 to 34)

Overview

What we picked from Chapter III and what we did not

The chapter describes the route from meeting the requirements to the CE marking. We picked the presumption of conformity and common specifications (Art. 27), the EU declaration of conformity (Art. 28), the rules for affixing the CE marking (Art. 30), the technical documentation (Art. 31), the conformity assessment procedures (Art. 32) and the support measures for smaller enterprises (Art. 33). We left out Art. 29, which only refers to the general principles of the CE marking in Regulation (EC) No 765/2008, and Art. 34 on mutual recognition agreements with third countries — neither has a direct effect on the obligations of a manufacturer in the Union.

CypherOn note
The order of work is the opposite of what usually gets planned. First the product category (Art. 7 and 8), from that the procedure under Art. 32, and only then the documentation — because for class I it is precisely the availability of harmonised standards that decides whether a notified body has to be involved. As of 8 August 2026, according to the Commission pages, no harmonised standard had been cited in the Official Journal for the CRA; what that means for planning is covered in the guide.
Official text: Chapter III on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 27

Presumption of conformity

Products and processes that are in conformity with harmonised standards, or parts of them, the references to which have been published in the Official Journal are presumed to be in conformity with those requirements of Annex I that the standards cover. The Commission requests the European standardisation organisations to draft the standards. Where the standards are not delivered or do not match the request, and no reference to them is expected in the Official Journal either, the Commission may lay down common specifications by implementing act, which create the presumption of conformity in the same way. A certificate or statement of conformity under a European cybersecurity certification scheme adopted under Regulation (EU) 2019/881 creates the presumption as well.

CypherOn note
The presumption of conformity is the only shortcut the regulation offers, and it arises only once the reference is published in the Official Journal — not because a standard exists or is “nearly ready”. Until the reference is there, the technical documentation has to describe the solutions you chose and why they meet Annex I (Annex VII, point 5), and for important class I products it means the standards cannot be “fully applied” and the route runs through a notified body. The practical consequence: do not wait for standards before working on Annex I, because that work will not change — the standards only make it cheaper to demonstrate.
Official text: Art. 27 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 28

EU declaration of conformity

The manufacturer draws up the declaration, states in it that the applicable requirements of Annex I have been demonstrated to be fulfilled, and assumes responsibility for its content. It follows the model in Annex V, contains the elements from the conformity assessment procedure used as set out in Annex VIII, is kept up to date, and must be available in the languages required by the Member State where the product is placed or made available on the market. A simplified version following the model in Annex VI must state the exact internet address at which the full declaration can be found. Where a product is subject to more than one Union act requiring a declaration, a single declaration is drawn up.

CypherOn note
Two things get overlooked. The declaration is kept up to date — it is not a one-off document dated to the moment of placing on the market, but a live record that has to match the current version of the product and the standards used. And the language is set by the Member State where you make the product available; under the draft Czech implementing act, Czech is to be required for the Czech market. For software the declaration is also the carrier of the CE marking, so having it available on your website is not a formality but a condition of compliance.
Official text: Art. 28 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 30

Rules and conditions for affixing the CE marking

The marking is affixed visibly, legibly and indelibly to the product; where that is not possible or not warranted, to the packaging and to the accompanying EU declaration of conformity. For products in the form of software it is affixed either to the EU declaration of conformity or to the website accompanying the product, where the relevant section must be easily and directly accessible to consumers. It is affixed before the product is placed on the market and is followed by the identification number of the notified body where one was involved in the assessment under module H.

CypherOn note
For software this is the most common misunderstanding: the CE marking is not drawn anywhere into the application interface — the carrier is the declaration of conformity or a publicly available web page. “Easily and directly accessible” means it must not sit three clicks deep in the support section; expect this to be a requirement on the website, that is, on a team that usually knows nothing about the CRA. Improper use of the marking is a separate ground for enforcement action under Art. 58.
Official text: Art. 30 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 31

Technical documentation

The documentation must contain all the data on the means by which the manufacturer ensured that the product and its processes comply with Annex I, and at least the elements set out in Annex VII. It is drawn up before the product is placed on the market and kept up to date at least for the support period. For products under Art. 12 that are also covered by other Union acts with documentation requirements, a single set is drawn up. The documentation and the correspondence relating to conformity assessment are kept in a language of the Member State of the notified body or in a language accepted by that body.

CypherOn note
The words “kept up to date” are the point here. Technical documentation is not an attachment to placing the product on the market, but a record that has to match what the product actually does for the whole support period — including the SBOM and the risk assessment. The cheapest way to keep it current is to generate parts of it from what development produces anyway (SBOM from the build, test results from CI) rather than writing them by hand. The contents are covered under Annex VII.
Official text: Art. 31 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 32

Conformity assessment procedures for products with digital elements

For a default product the manufacturer chooses between internal control (module A), EU type-examination with a follow-up module C, conformity assessment based on full quality assurance (module H) and, where available, a European cybersecurity certification scheme. For an important class I product under Annex III, if the manufacturer has not applied harmonised standards, common specifications or certification at least at level “substantial”, has applied them only in part, or they do not exist, the route must run through modules B and C or through module H. For class II, third-party assessment is always mandatory. For critical products under Annex IV, the European cybersecurity certification scheme under Art. 8(1) applies, and where its conditions are not met, the class II regime. Fees are to take the needs of smaller enterprises into account.

CypherOn note
The practical reading for 2026: until a harmonised standard is cited in the Official Journal, being in class I means essentially the same as class II — a notified body. That is the most expensive consequence of the whole classification, and it is why it pays to decide the classification under Annexes III and IV now and back it with the technical description from Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392. The second point: the capacity of notified bodies is only being built, and Chapter IV has applied only since 11 June 2026. Anyone aiming at December 2027 with a class II product should have a slot booked with a body well in advance.
Official text: Art. 32 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 33

Support measures for microenterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises

Member States are to provide smaller enterprises with awareness raising and training, a dedicated channel for questions about implementing the regulation, and support for testing and conformity assessment. They may also establish regulatory sandboxes as a controlled testing environment before a product is placed on the market. Microenterprises and small enterprises may provide the elements of the technical documentation under Annex VII in a simplified form; the form is to be laid down by the Commission in an implementing act and notified bodies must accept it.

CypherOn note
The relief concerns the form of the documentation, not the scope of the obligations — a small manufacturer is not let off the risk assessment, the SBOM or the support period. And there is no point waiting for the Commission to issue the form: prepare the documentation in the ordinary way under Annex VII, and transferring it into the form later is a matter of hours. Note also that enterprise size is assessed under Recommendation 2003/361/EC, that is, including linked and partner enterprises.
Official text: Art. 33 on EUR-Lex ↗

Chapters IV–VIII

Notified bodies, market surveillance, penalties and final provisions (Art. 35 to 71)

Overview

What we picked from these chapters and what we did not

We picked four provisions with a direct effect on manufacturers: market surveillance (Art. 52), penalties (Art. 64), transitional provisions (Art. 69) and application (Art. 71). We left out the whole of Chapter IV on the notification of conformity assessment bodies (Art. 35 to 51) — it is addressed to the Member States and to the bodies themselves, and the only practical information a manufacturer takes from it is that it has applied since 11 June 2026 and that the capacity of the bodies is still being built. We also left out the procedural part of market surveillance (Art. 53 to 60), the delegated powers and the committee procedure (Art. 61 and 62), confidentiality (Art. 63), representative actions (Art. 65), the amendments to other acts (Art. 66 to 68) and the evaluation and review (Art. 70).

CypherOn note
One thing among the omitted parts is worth noting: Art. 65 makes infringements of the regulation subject to the Representative Actions Directive. So alongside an administrative fine there is also a route for consumer organisations, and it follows a different logic from market surveillance.
Official text: Chapters IV to VIII on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 52

Market surveillance and control of products in the Union market

Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 on market surveillance applies to products within the scope of the regulation, and each Member State designates one or more market surveillance authorities. The same authorities also supervise the obligations of open-source software stewards under Art. 24. In supervising the reporting obligations they cooperate with the CSIRTs and with ENISA; for products that are at the same time high-risk AI systems, the authorities designated under the AI Act take over the role. A dedicated administrative cooperation group is established, which among other things publishes statistics on support periods by product category and issues guidance on them.

CypherOn note
Paragraph 16 is worth noticing even if market surveillance is not on your mind yet: support periods will be published by product category, so your number will be publicly comparable with the competition. That makes the support period a marketing parameter as well as a legal one. Who will exercise surveillance in the Czech Republic is for the implementing act to settle, and as of 8 August 2026 it has not been adopted — we track the status in the guide.
Official text: Art. 52 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 64

Penalties

The levels are graduated by what is breached. Non-compliance with the essential requirements of Annex I and with the obligations under Art. 13 and 14 carries an administrative fine of up to EUR 15 000 000 or, for an undertaking, up to 2.5 % of total worldwide annual turnover for the preceding financial year, whichever is higher. Infringements of the obligations under Art. 18 to 23, Art. 28, Art. 30(1) to (4), Art. 31(1) to (4), Art. 32(1) to (3), Art. 33(5) and Art. 39, 41, 47, 49 and 53 have a ceiling of EUR 10 000 000 or 2 %. Supplying incorrect, incomplete or misleading information to notified bodies and market surveillance authorities carries EUR 5 000 000 or 1 %. The amount takes account of the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement, of fines imposed previously and of the size of the entity. Paragraph 10 then, by way of derogation from paragraphs 3 to 9, rules out fines for microenterprises and small enterprises for missing the early warning deadline under Art. 14(2), point (a), and Art. 14(4), point (a), and for open-source software stewards for any infringement of the regulation.

CypherOn note
Two notes on the exception in paragraph 10. First, it covers only the 24-hour early warning deadline — it does not extend to the 72-hour deadline or to the final report, so even a microenterprise has to report. Second, it is drafted as a derogation from paragraphs 3 to 9, whereas the level for infringements of Art. 14 sits in paragraph 2; how that inconsistency will be read is not settled, and we would not plan around it. In any case the composition matters more than the amounts: the highest ceiling attaches to Annex I and to Art. 13 and 14, that is, to product security and reporting, not to the paperwork around the CE marking.
Official text: Art. 64 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 69

Transitional provisions

EU type-examination certificates and approval decisions issued for cybersecurity requirements under other Union harmonisation acts remain valid until 11 June 2028, unless they expire earlier or unless those acts provide otherwise. Products placed on the market before 11 December 2027 are subject to the regulation only if they undergo a substantial modification after that date. By way of derogation, however, the obligations under Art. 14 apply to all products within the scope of the regulation that were placed on the market before 11 December 2027.

CypherOn note
Paragraph 3 is the most overlooked sentence in the whole regulation. It means you will be reporting for products that are on the market today and that conformity assessment will never touch. For most companies it is the first CRA obligation they ever meet, and it covers the entire existing portfolio — not just new lines. The second point: paragraph 2 turns substantial modification into a switch. A product you rework heavily after 2027 moves into the full regime, which is a legitimate argument for splitting a large release into an earlier and a later part.
Official text: Art. 69 on EUR-Lex ↗
Art. 71

Entry into force and application

The regulation entered into force on the twentieth day following its publication in the Official Journal. It applies from 11 December 2027, with two exceptions: Article 14 applies from 11 September 2026, and Chapter IV, that is Articles 35 to 51 on the notification of conformity assessment bodies, from 11 June 2026. The regulation is binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

CypherOn note
The difference between entry into force and application is the most common source of confusion on the Czech market. The regulation has been in force since December 2024, but products will only be assessed against it from December 2027 — except for reporting, which starts on 11 September 2026. For planning that means two separate tracks: the reporting process has to be finished this year, while documentation and conformity assessment have a 2027 horizon. Direct applicability then means there is no waiting for the Czech act; that one only settles surveillance and penalties.
Official text: Art. 71 on EUR-Lex ↗

Annexes

Annexes I to VIII

Overview

Eight annexes and what is in them

The annexes carry most of the substance of the regulation. Annex I contains the essential cybersecurity requirements in two parts, Annex II the information and instructions to the user, Annexes III and IV the categories of important and critical products, Annexes V and VI the models for the EU declaration of conformity and its simplified version, Annex VII the content of the technical documentation and Annex VIII the conformity assessment procedures based on modules A, B, C and H. We cover six of them; the declaration models in Annexes V and VI are left aside, because they are forms to be filled in, not rules to be interpreted.

CypherOn note
If you have an hour for the CRA and want to get the most out of it, read Annex I. The rest of the regulation describes who has to demonstrate it, when and how — but what actually has to be done is only there.
Official text: the annexes on EUR-Lex ↗
Annex I

Part I — requirements relating to the properties of products

Point 1 is general: the product must be designed, developed and produced so as to ensure an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks. Point 2 then sets out thirteen specific properties, points (a) to (m), which apply where applicable on the basis of the risk assessment under Art. 13(2) — being made available without known exploitable vulnerabilities, a secure by default configuration with the possibility of resetting the product to its original state, the ability to address vulnerabilities through security updates, protection from unauthorised access, confidentiality and integrity of data, data minimisation, availability of essential and basic functions after an incident, minimising the adverse impact of the product itself, limiting attack surfaces, reducing the impact of an incident, recording and monitoring security-relevant activity, and the possibility to remove or transfer data securely and permanently.

CypherOn note
The phrase “where applicable, on the basis of the risk assessment” is the key to the whole annex and at the same time the most abused sentence in the regulation. It does not mean you pick and choose among the requirements — it means that for each of the thirteen you must be able to say whether it applies to the product and how it is implemented, and where it does not apply, the justification belongs in the technical documentation (Art. 13(4)). The fastest way to establish that is a threat model sitting on the actual product, not a questionnaire. Watch point (b): a different agreement on the default configuration is possible only with a business user and only for a tailor-made product.
Official text: Annex I on EUR-Lex ↗
Annex I

Part II — vulnerability handling requirements

Eight requirements on the processes of the manufacturer. Identify and document vulnerabilities and components contained in the product, including by drawing up a software bill of materials in a machine-readable format covering at least the top-level dependencies. Address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay and, where technically feasible, provide security updates separately from functionality updates. Apply regular tests and reviews of security. Once a fix has been released, publish information about the vulnerability, its impact and severity and about how to remediate it, with the option of delaying publication in duly justified cases. Put in place and enforce a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy. Facilitate the sharing of information and provide a contact address for reporting. Have mechanisms for distributing updates securely, automatically where that is possible. Disseminate security updates without delay and free of charge, together with an advisory message.

CypherOn note
This is the half of the regulation that no amount of product quality will rescue. An SBOM covering “at least the top-level dependencies” does not mean a hand-maintained table — it should come out of the build, otherwise it is stale before you finish writing it. Point 8 is worth noting commercially: security updates must be free of charge, with a single exception for a tailor-made product by agreement with a business user. Paid support can therefore exist, but it must not be a condition for obtaining a security fix. What these processes look like in CI/CD is covered in the DevSecOps guide.
Official text: Annex I on EUR-Lex ↗
Annex II

Information and instructions to the user

It lists what has to accompany the product: the identity and contact details of the manufacturer, the single point of contact for reporting vulnerabilities and a reference to the coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, an unambiguous identification of the product, the intended purpose including the security environment and the security functionalities, known or foreseeable circumstances that may lead to significant risks, where applicable the address at which the EU declaration of conformity can be found, the type of technical security support offered and the end date of the support period, and detailed instructions or a reference to them — on putting the product into service, on the effect of changes on the security of data, on installing updates and on secure decommissioning including the deletion of user data.

CypherOn note
Annex II is the only part of the regulation the customer ever sees, which makes it the easiest way to tell whether a manufacturer is dealing with the CRA or merely pretending to. In practice it is work for documentation and product marketing, not for the security team — but the brief has to come from the security team. We recommend turning Annex II into a one-page template and making it mandatory for every product line; it is the cheapest item in the whole compliance effort and at the same time the one a market surveillance authority will see first.
Official text: Annex II on EUR-Lex ↗
Annex III

Important products with digital elements

It contains two classes. Class I has nineteen categories — among them identity management and privileged access management software and hardware, browsers, password managers, software that searches for, removes or quarantines malicious software, products with a virtual private network function, network management systems, security information and event management systems, boot managers, public key infrastructure, network interfaces, operating systems, routers and switches, microprocessors, microcontrollers and ASIC and FPGA circuits with security-related functionalities, smart home virtual assistants and smart home products with security functionalities, internet connected toys with interactive or location-tracking features, and personal wearable products with a health monitoring purpose. Class II has four categories: hypervisors and container runtime systems, firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems, and tamper-resistant microprocessors and microcontrollers.

CypherOn note
The category names are short and will not settle the classification of a borderline product on their own — which is why Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392 was adopted with a technical description. Two things surprise people. The categories are written functionally, so “products with the function of a virtual private network” or “network management systems” also catch a product sold under a completely different name — what counts is the core functionality under Art. 7, not the marketing category (and conversely, merely embedding such a function in another product does not make that product an important one). The second: wearable products intended for use by children are in the annex even if they measure nothing health-related. Put the classification in writing, with reasons, because it determines whether you will need a notified body.
Official text: Annex III on EUR-Lex ↗
Annex IV

Critical products with digital elements

The shortest annex and the one with the heaviest consequences. It contains three items: hardware devices with security boxes; smart meter gateways within smart metering systems as defined in Directive (EU) 2019/944 and other devices for advanced security purposes; and smart cards or similar devices, including secure elements.

CypherOn note
🚨 In the second item the Czech text diverges from the English in a way that changes the meaning. The English version refers to devices for advanced security purposes “including for secure cryptoprocessing”; at the same place the Czech text speaks of securely receiving cryptocurrency payments. That is a material difference in the scope of the category, and in case of doubt we recommend comparing both language versions and basing the classification decision on the English text and on the technical description in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2392. It is also a good illustration of why we do not reproduce the official text on this page and why every provision carries a link to EUR-Lex.
English text: Annex IV ↗ · Czech text: Annex IV ↗
Annex VII

Content of the technical documentation

Eight points. A general description of the product including its intended purpose, the versions affecting compliance and, where applicable, photographs and the information and instructions under Annex II. A description of the design, development and production and of the vulnerability handling processes — this is where the architecture belongs, together with the software bill of materials, the coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, evidence of the contact address for reporting and a description of the secure distribution of updates. The cybersecurity risk assessment under Art. 13, including how the requirements of Part I of Annex I apply. The information the manufacturer relied on when determining the support period. A list of the harmonised standards and common specifications applied, or a description of the solutions adopted where they were not. Test reports. A copy of the EU declaration of conformity. And, on a reasoned request from a market surveillance authority, the software bill of materials.

CypherOn note
Point 8 answers the most frequent question about SBOMs: you do not have to publish it. It is submitted to the market surveillance authority on a reasoned request, and to users only if you decide so yourselves. Point 5, in turn, is why the documentation is harder to write in 2026 than it will be in 2028 — until harmonised standards are cited, you have to describe your own solutions and defend why they meet Annex I. And point 3 is the test of whether the risk assessment came about during development or only at the end; the text usually gives it away.
Official text: Annex VII on EUR-Lex ↗
Annex VIII

Conformity assessment procedures

It describes the modules referred to in Art. 32. Part I is internal control based on module A: the manufacturer draws up the technical documentation under Annex VII, ensures on its own responsibility that the product and its processes comply with Annex I, affixes the CE marking and draws up a written EU declaration of conformity, which it keeps together with the documentation for at least ten years or for the support period. The other parts describe EU type-examination based on module B, where a notified body examines the technical design, the development and the vulnerability handling processes, the follow-up conformity to type based on module C, and conformity assessment based on full quality assurance under module H.

CypherOn note
The difference between the modules is mainly in what you show to the outside. Under module A nobody sees your documentation in advance, but that does not mean it can be weaker — a market surveillance authority can ask for it at any time, and any shortcomings then get dealt with on a product that is already on the market. Module B checks a specific type, module H your quality system; for companies with frequent releases module H tends to be cheaper, because the examination is not repeated for every variant. Make the choice together with the decision on the category, not once the product is finished.
Official text: Annex VIII on EUR-Lex ↗
Content valid as of 8 August 2026

Working on a specific product?

The text is one thing,
building it into development another.

We will go through scope with you, the classification under Annexes III and IV, the gaps against Annex I and the reporting process under Art. 14 that has to work from 11 September 2026. On your actual product, not on a generic slide deck — and the first call commits you to nothing.