Guide · DORA for ICT providers
What Article 30 of DORA obliges a financial entity to have in the contract, why it cannot drop those clauses, and where the real room to negotiate is.
Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 on digital operational resilience for the financial sector, DORA for short, applies from 17 January 2025 under Article 64. Its obligations fall on financial entities — banks, insurers, payment institutions, investment firms and others. As a provider of information and communication technology you usually take on no obligations directly from the regulation. You take them on through the contract, because a financial entity may neither conclude nor maintain a contract that lacks certain provisions.
That is the whole reason these addenda keep arriving. It is not an initiative of the legal department and, for the most part, not room for the other side to invent things either: Article 30 sets out a list that has to be in the contract. The practical difference from ordinary negotiation is that on these points the argument "this does not suit us" simply does not work — the other side cannot drop them even if it wanted to.
The definition of a provider is broad and has no size threshold. Under Article 3(19) an ICT third-party service provider is any undertaking providing ICT services, and under Article 3(21) ICT services are digital and data services provided on an ongoing basis through ICT systems to one or more internal or external users, including hardware as a service and hardware services with technical support through software or firmware updates. Only traditional analogue telephone services are expressly excluded. A three-person software house is therefore an ICT provider in exactly the same way as a global cloud provider.
The second source of requirements is the register. Under Article 28(3) the financial entity maintains a register of information on all contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services, at entity level and at sub-consolidated and consolidated level. That is why questionnaires contain items that seem to have nothing to do with the contract: a legal entity identifier, the country where the service is provided, notice periods in days, or a list of subcontractors. These are not inquisitive questions, they are fields in a supervisory return.
A useful first question to send by e-mail, before you start reading the addendum paragraph by paragraph: does our service support a critical or important function? The answer decides half of the text you have received, and the other side knows it — that is precisely how it assembled the addendum.
Article 30 is built in two tiers and it pays to see that straight away. Paragraph 2 contains nine elements, points (a) to (i), which every contractual arrangement on the use of ICT services has to contain — regardless of what your service supports. Paragraph 3 adds six further topics, points (a) to (f), and does so expressly "in addition to the elements referred to in paragraph 2". For a service supporting a critical or important function, both therefore apply cumulatively.
What a critical or important function is follows from Article 3(22): a function whose disruption would materially impair the financial performance of the financial entity or the soundness or continuity of its services and activities, or whose discontinued, defective or failed performance would materially impair its continuing compliance with the conditions and obligations of its authorisation or with its other obligations under financial services law. The assessment is made by the financial entity, not by you — and you will recognise the result from how tough an addendum you get.
The nine elements of paragraph 2 look innocent on a first read, and a sensible software supply contract has most of them anyway. Two of them, however, change the pricing model and one changes the operating regime, so there is no point in waving them through as formalities. Paragraph 3 is then the part over which addenda are negotiated for months; separate sections below are devoted to it.
Of the nine elements of paragraph 2, point (f) is the one most often underestimated in practice. The sentence about assistance at no additional cost or at a cost determined ex ante reads like a truism, but it means that extraordinary support during an incident has to have a price agreed in advance — and if you do not agree one in advance, the no-additional-cost variant is what applies.
For services supporting critical or important functions, Article 30(3)(e) gives the financial entity the right to monitor the provider's performance on an ongoing basis and breaks that right down into four points. Point (i) is an unrestricted right of access, inspection and audit exercised by the financial entity or an appointed third party and by the competent authority, together with the right to take copies on site of documentation critical to the provider's operations. And it adds immediately that the effective exercise of those rights must not be impeded or limited by other contractual arrangements or implementation policies.
That last sentence is why the customary clause along the lines of "audits are carried out solely under the provider's audit policy" does not survive in an addendum. It is not obstinacy on the other side: accepting it would mean concluding a contract that contradicts the text of the regulation. The same goes for references to general terms and conditions that in effect rule audits out.
The remaining three points read far better, because they are exactly where the room is. Point (ii) expressly contemplates the right to agree alternative assurance levels where other clients' rights are affected — typically in a shared environment. Point (iii) requires full cooperation during on-site inspections and audits performed by the competent authorities, the Lead Overseer, the financial entity or an appointed third party. Point (iv) then requires details on the scope, the procedures to be followed and the frequency of those inspections and audits, which cuts both ways: once the frequency is described, it stops being unrestricted in any practical sense.
The other side of the same coin is in the regulatory technical standard governing the financial entity's policy, that is in Regulation (EU) 2024/1773. Under its Article 8(2) the financial entity has four methods available: its own internal audit or an audit by an appointed third party, where appropriate pooled audits and pooled testing organised jointly with other clients of the same provider, where appropriate third-party certifications, and internal or third-party audit reports. Under Article 8(3), however, it must not rely on certifications or audit reports alone over time, and may do so in the short term only under the conditions listed in that same paragraph.
There is one derogation and it is regularly confused. Under the subparagraph following Article 30(3)(f), a provider and a financial entity that is a microenterprise may agree that the rights of access, inspection and audit are delegated to an independent third party appointed by the provider, with the microenterprise able to request information and assurance from that third party at any time. The derogation hangs on the size of the financial entity, not the size of the provider, and it concerns point (e) only.
The basis is Article 30(2)(a): the description of the services has to state whether subcontracting of ICT services supporting critical or important functions, or material parts of them, is permitted and, if so, on what conditions. Hanging on that hook is Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/532, adopted under Article 30(5), which has seven articles and specifies what the financial entity has to determine and assess in relation to subcontracting.
Three of them matter to a provider. Under Article 3(1) of that regulation the financial entity has to decide, before entering into the contract, whether it will permit subcontracting at all, and may only conclude the contract if all the conditions in points (a) to (j) are met. Among them: that the subcontractor grants the financial entity, the competent authorities and the resolution authorities the same contractual rights of access and inspection as you do yourself, that the financial entity has assessed concentration risk under Article 29 of DORA, and that there are no impediments to the exercise of audit and access rights.
Article 4 then describes what has to be in the contract for that to work — twelve items under points (a) to (l). Alongside responsibility for the services provided by subcontractors and the duty to monitor them, it also requires your contracts with subcontractors to contain business contingency plan requirements under Article 30(3)(c) of DORA and to specify ICT security standards, and the subcontractor to grant rights of access, inspection and audit to the same extent as Article 30(3)(e). This is what is meant by passing the requirements down the chain, and it is the most laborious part of the whole addendum, because it concerns contracts you have already signed.
Article 5 introduces an approval mechanism for material changes: you have to give sufficient advance notice of intended material changes to subcontracting arrangements, the contract contains a reasonable notice period for approval or objection, and you may only implement the change once the financial entity has approved it or has not objected by the end of that period. Article 6 adds the grounds on which the other side may terminate the contract — among them where you subcontract a service supporting a critical or important function although the contract does not expressly permit it.
Under Article 3(3) of Regulation (EU) 2025/532, relying on the results of assessments that providers carry out on their own subcontractors does not relieve the financial entity of ultimate responsibility for discharging its obligations. That is why the other side wants evidence from you rather than statements — and why it pays to keep that evidence in usable form instead of assembling it afresh for every questionnaire.
Article 30(2)(b) is one of the nine elements mandatory in every contract on ICT services, including those that have nothing to do with a critical function. The contract has to state the locations — namely the regions or countries — where the contracted or subcontracted ICT functions and services are to be provided and where data is to be processed, including the storage location. And with it the duty to notify the financial entity in advance if you envisage changing those locations.
The phrase "namely the regions or countries" is why wording such as "within the European Union" usually does not pass. It is connected to the register of information: in Annex I, template B_02.02, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956 asks for the country of provision of the ICT services, the location of data storage and the location of management, that is of data processing. It is reported as a two-letter ISO 3166-1 code, so the answer "EU" does not belong in the field and the other side cannot use it.
Third countries deserve particular attention. Under Article 29(2), for contracts covering critical or important functions the financial entity weighs the benefits and risks of subcontracting, especially where the subcontractor is established in a third country, duly considers the insolvency law provisions and the constraints that may arise on urgent recovery of data, and assesses whether and how potentially long or complex subcontracting chains may affect its ability to monitor the contracted functions and the authorities' ability to supervise effectively. So if your architecture includes a service operated outside the EU, expect the addendum to tighten in this part.
Point (b) is often confused with the data processing agreement. They are two different layers: personal data protection has its own legal regime, whereas DORA asks about all data processed by the financial entity and about the locations of service provision as such. The two usually sit in the same addendum, but the provisions do not substitute for one another.
The regulation sets no incident reporting deadline for providers. The number you find in the addendum is derived from the deadlines the other side has to meet. Under Article 5 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, the financial entity submits the initial notification as early as possible and in any event within four hours of classifying the incident as major, and no later than 24 hours from becoming aware of it. The intermediate report follows no later than 72 hours after the initial notification, and the final report no later than one month after the intermediate report or its last update.
That is where the demand for reporting in hours or in tens of minutes comes from. The other side does not need it in order to police you, but because without your information it cannot classify the incident — while its own classification clock is running. This is worth knowing in negotiation: the aim is not the shortest number, but that the other side gets usable information in time.
Two provisions of the contract deal with this. Article 30(2)(f) requires assistance during an ICT incident at no additional cost or at a cost determined ex ante. Article 30(3)(b) then adds, for critical or important functions, notice periods and reporting obligations, including notification of any development that might have a material impact on your ability to provide the service at the agreed service levels. That last part is often overlooked: it is not only about incidents, but also about changes on your side that may yet turn into one.
Weekends have a special regime. Under Article 5(4) of Regulation (EU) 2025/301, where a deadline falls on a weekend or a public holiday the financial entity may submit the notification by noon of the following working day, but under paragraph 5 that extension does not apply to the initial notification and the intermediate report of credit institutions, central counterparties, trading venues and other entities considered essential or important under Directive (EU) 2022/2555. If your customer is a bank, do not count on the weekend relief.
For services supporting critical or important functions, Article 30(3)(f) requires exit strategies, in particular the establishment of a mandatory adequate transition period. During it the provider continues to provide the functions or services concerned so as to reduce the risk of disruption, and the financial entity can migrate to another provider or move to an in-house solution consistent with the complexity of the service provided. It is therefore not merely a notice period: it is a commitment to keep operating at the very moment the relationship has already been decided to end.
Hand in hand with that goes Article 30(2)(d), mandatory in every contract on ICT services: ensuring access, recovery and return of personal and non-personal data in an easily accessible format in the event of the provider's insolvency, resolution or discontinuation of business operations, and on termination of the contractual arrangement. The phrase "in an easily accessible format", left unspecified, is a source of disputes, and it is therefore worth spelling it out in the contract.
The pressure on this part of the addendum does not come from Article 30 alone. Under Article 28(7) the contract has to be terminable in four sets of circumstances — a significant breach of law or of the contractual terms, circumstances identified that are capable of altering the performance of the contracted functions, evidenced weaknesses in the provider's overall ICT risk management, and a situation in which the competent authority can no longer effectively supervise the financial entity because of the arrangement. Under Article 28(8) the financial entity has to be able to terminate without disrupting its activities and its compliance with regulatory requirements or harming the continuity and quality of services to clients, and exit plans have to be documented, sufficiently tested and reviewed periodically.
The practical consequence for you: the other side will want an exit described in a way that can be rehearsed. Article 10 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1773 requires it to have a termination plan for every contractual arrangement, drawn up for three scenarios — unforeseen and persistent interruption of services, inadequate or failed provision of services, and unexpected termination of the arrangement — and requires the plan to be realistic, feasible and to have a timeline compatible with the termination conditions in the contract.
Specific data from this section find their way into the register of information: the notice period for the financial entity and for the provider in days, whether a termination plan exists, and how demanding it would be to reintegrate the service back inside the organisation. In other words, what you negotiate shows up in the data the other side sends to its supervisor.
Alongside the addendum, a spreadsheet usually arrives too. The format of the register of information is set by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2956, and the data the other side needs from you is largely machine-checked — which is why it asks in such a formalised way. Under Article 3(5), all providers that are legal persons are identified by a valid and active legal entity identifier (LEI) or European Unique Identifier (EUID), or both. The exception is natural persons acting in a business capacity.
For services supporting critical or important functions the requirement goes further. Under Article 3(6) the financial entity ensures, through the direct provider, that a valid and active LEI is used or an EUID provided by all subcontractors that effectively underpin those services. In other words: the identifier requirement travels down the chain through you, and it is a practical matter worth flagging to subcontractors before the reporting date arrives.
The second thing that comes as a surprise is threat-led penetration testing. Under Article 30(3)(d), a contract covering a critical or important function has to oblige the provider to participate and fully cooperate in the threat-led penetration testing carried out by the financial entity, as referred to in Articles 26 and 27. It is not the same thing as the penetration test you may be commissioning yourself: under Article 3(17) it is a controlled test of critical live production systems that mimics the tactics, techniques and procedures of real attackers.
The scope of that testing also carries weight in time. Designated financial entities carry it out at least every three years under Article 26(1), on systems actually used in production under Article 26(2), and the active red team testing phase lasts in any event at least twelve weeks under Article 11(5) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190. If you are within scope, this is not half a day of assistance.
What the register looks like exactly, which templates it contains and what goes into them is covered by the separate page on the register of information in this category. For negotiating the addendum it is enough to know which data the other side has to obtain from you and why it cannot accept a general answer.
The fastest way to find your bearings in an addendum is to split it into three piles. The first holds provisions that literally track Article 30(2) and (3) — there the substance is not negotiable, at most the wording and the operational detail. The second holds what follows from the technical standards, mainly Regulation (EU) 2025/532 on subcontracting and Regulation (EU) 2024/1773 on audits and monitoring — there the room lies in how the obligation is met. The third holds everything else: commercial requirements, penalties, insurance, certificates. That third pile is ordinary commercial negotiation.
It helps in negotiation to know that Article 30(4) expects financial entities and providers to consider the use of standard contractual clauses developed by public authorities for specific services. It is a duty to consider, not a duty to use such clauses, but it is a legitimate argument against every counterparty drafting its own wording of the same requirement.
The second thing that pays off: answer once. Most requirements repeat across customers, so a single pack of materials — a list of subcontractors with processing locations, a service level description with quantitative targets, the data export procedure, the incident contact channel, evidence of security measures and any audit reports or certifications — saves more time than individual answers to individual questionnaires. It is also exactly what the other side will need again at every update of the register.
And a final note on what the addendum actually means. The provisions of Article 30 are not paper: they describe an operation that has to exist. Signing up to report developments with a material impact, or to a transition period with continued operation, is a commitment that someone on your side has to be able to meet on a particular day. That is why it makes sense to read the addendum with the operations team, not only with a lawyer.
When there are two addenda and each bank's is different, it pays to describe your own situation first — services, chain, locations, deadlines, exit — and only then read the addenda against it, rather than negotiating each one separately. A description written once serves for the next customer and for the register update as well.
The sequence that works for us with providers who have just received their first addendum. It is not a requirement of the regulation — it is a way to find your bearings in the text before the negotiation over individual sentences starts. The steps overlap, and with the second and every further customer most of them fall away, because you will already have the materials.
The statements about obligations on this page are based on the following legal acts, as of 9 August 2026. This material does not replace their wording — the binding text is the one published in the Official Journal, in which every language version is equally authentic; the links point to the English one.
An addendum from a financial entity
A free initial consultation over your specific addendum: what in it comes straight from the regulation, what follows from the technical standards and what is a commercial requirement of the other side. Write to us about what you supply and which provisions are giving you trouble.